Saga of the Jasonite

The continuing adventures of that eternal man of mystery…


What is Marriage? Part Eight, A Cruel Bargain?

Marriage Marriage

This is part 8 of 8 of my series on marriage, based on Girgis’ What is Marriage? Marriage is a comprehensive union. The state has excellent reasons to recognize it, and excellent reasons to enact the correct view of it. These reasons are rooted not in some obscure ideology or private interest, but variously and deeply in human nature and the common good of all society, which reason and experience reveal. These have been the themes of this series.

Many same-sex attracted men and women agree with this conclusion. Some do so because they object to casting same-sex unions in a mold designed for husbands and wives, but others cite reasons identical to or much like ones that have been offered in this series. Here is a link to one such, here is another and here is a third. You might fear that whatever gains the conjugal view wins for the many, it wins at a cruel cost for the few. This objection states that traditional marriage law harms the personal fulfillment, the practical interests, and the social standing of same-sex-attracted people.

Practical interests:  a civil union or other policy that granted legal benefits to any two adults upon request would receive no objection from the conjugal marriage view. People can normally obtain these benefits privately, for example, through power of attorney. Personal fulfillment and social standing:  please note that however the marriage debate is resolved, two men or two women will be free to live together, with or without a sexual relationship or a wedding ceremony. The same-sex civil marriage debate is not about anyone’s private behavior, but about legal recognition. The decision to honor conjugal marriage bans nothing. But neither does it discourage companionship. Not recognizing certain relationships as civil marriages will not make people lonelier unless we embrace the revisionist idea that emotional intimacy is what sets marriage apart–which is not true. A relationship may be of the greatest worth without calling for state recognition–especially if recognizing it would have harmful side effects. People rightly take delight in the public knowledge of their bonds in all kinds of relationships. Yet no one proposes to make friendships, for example recognized by law. Legal recognition only makes sense when something needs regulation, and can only regulate relationships with a definite structure. As has been shown, the only romantic bond that meets this criterion is marriage–conjugal marriage.

Please do not mistakenly assume that the conjugal view is concerned with targeting same-sex relationships. It is the redefinition of marriage that is concerning. What I wish to avoid is the harm this does to the common good. In the first and last analysis, what I have debated–and what I have defended–is marriage. There is no such thing as a neutral marriage policy. Marriage understood as the conjugal union of husband and wife really serves the good of children, the good of spouses, and the common good of society.

There is one final point to make, addressing full disclosure and transparency. Here I do not speak for Girgis, Anderson, George or anyone else. The reason I have spent the large amount of time and work I have on this series of blog entries is to explicate in as clear and detailed and cogent a fashion as I can the reasons I do not support any form of marriage other than the conjugal view. Their paper which turned into an essay, or whatever you want to call it, is the best way I’ve yet found to express it, however it is not complete. Of necessity they (and I) have only thus far considered implications through a secular lens. However, as those who have followed my blog for any length of time must know, I am also a spiritual and religious person. I want it clear that the genesis and root of my belief in conjugal marriage is that marriage is not the product of the human mind. It is not something that two people, or a community or a nation simply “came up with” somewhere back in the misty dawn of human civilization. Rather it was given by God himself, first to Adam and Eve, and subsequently to the whole human race.

As God has given this gift of marriage, and indeed His first commandment to Adam and Eve was to “multiply and replenish the Earth,” He is the only one who can set the terms of what marriage is. No other being has that right. In my view, the many great goods that marriage brings to pass only do so because they are following the order that God has given. God has not changed His definition of marriage. To deviate from it is to at best dilute these goods, and at worst to pervert them to the degradation and degeneracy of civilization. Marriage is what it is, and man does not have the power to alter it or legislate to modify it, any more than he can alter any of the other laws of the universe. As has been said by others, “He designated the purposes of marriage to go far beyond the personal satisfaction and fulfillment of adults to, more importantly, advancing the ideal setting for children to be born, reared, and nurtured.” It is not my intention to give offense to any, simply to be as clear as I can in presenting my view.

                                                                 Part Seven

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What is Marriage? Part Seven, Justice and Equality



Revisionists raise objections to the conjugal view:  that it is inconsistent in recognizing infertile marriages, and at odds with the principle of equal access to marriage. Here I’ll show that both objections fail.

First, infertility. An infertile man and woman can together still form a true marriage–a comprehensive union–which would differ only in degree, not type, from a fertile union. Recognizing such unions as marriages has none of the costs of recognizing same-sex or other unions, most of the benefits of recognizing fertile unions, and at least one additional benefit. To form a true marriage a couple needs to establish a comprehensive mind-and-body union, and be permanent and exclusive. With or without children these relationships are all comprehensive in these three senses, and without exception, same-sex and multiple-partner unions are not. A marital act between two people must combine the right behavior with the right intention.

Take intention. For any couple’s act of bodily union to be an act of marital union, they need not choose it for the sake of conceiving, but simply to make concrete their marriage. An act of sexual intercourse is bodily union whether or not it causes conception, as our law has always recognized. The man and woman’s bodies are still united toward reproduction. The nature of the behavior doesn’t depend on what happens hours later outside of their control:  whether an egg is fertilized. Intercourse remains a form of bodily coordination toward a single bodily end (whether or not it is an end they seek) and thus a form of bodily union. And that–being a bodily union, not actually causing conception–is what makes sex, if chosen with the intention to embody or renew their marriage, a valuable part of the whole:  a marital act that extends a marital, or comprehensive, union. That is why, as our law has always recognized, infertility is no impediment to marriage, something good in itself, existing with or without children. A friendship of two men or two women is also valuable in itself. But lacking the capacity for bodily union it cannot be valuable specifically as a marriage:  it cannot be comprehensive, nor ordered to procreation on which marriage depends.

Recognizing infertile marriages carry none of the costs of recognizing same-sex, polyamorous or other nonmarital unions. It does not make it harder for people to realize the basic good of marriage, for it does not undermine the public’s grasp of the nature of true marriage. Nor does it undermine marital norms, or make mothers or fathers seem superfluous. It prejudices no one’s religious or moral freedom. An obviously infertile couple can live out the features of true marriage, and so contribute to a strong marriage culture. There is also one special benefit. To recognize only fertile marriages would be to suggest that marriage is valuable only as a means to children–and not what it truly is, a good in itself. So recognizing the marriages of infertile couples serves at least one purpose better than recognizing only fertile unions does:  to recall for us the crucial truth that marriage has value in itself.

Second, equality. Revisionists often equate traditional marriage laws with laws banning interracial marriages, stating that all should have equal access to marriage. The analogy to interracial marriages fails for many reasons, but two are decisive. First, opponents of interracial marriage did not deny that marriage was possible between Blacks and Whites any more than segregationists argued that some features of the Whites-only drinking fountains made it impossible for Blacks to drink from them. The reason laws banning interracial marriage existed was to maintain White supremacy. Many states refused to recognize marriages between Black slaves for similar, White supremacist reasons; and marriages between two different non-White races, having no effect on White supremacy, were generally allowed. Revisionists would not leave our basic understanding of marriage intact and simply expand the pool of people eligible to marry, they would abolish the conjugal view of marriage from our law and replace it with the revisionist view.

Second, while history shows that hostility motivated laws banning interracial marriage, it rules out this explanation of traditional marriage laws. Yes, homosexual acts were widely condemned for centuries here in the West, and still are by many people and religious traditions. But so were those same acts between a husband and wife, such as sodomy. The basics of marriage law allowed consummation by no other act than intercourse, even between a wedded man and woman. Some cultures, as in ancient Greece and Rome, recognized only opposite-sex unions as marriages even when they celebrated homo-eroticism. Only ignorance of all these facts could support an idea that anti-gay hostility shaped our marriage law and that of every other culture as well.

The analogy to interracial marriages would also mean that any kind of distinction is discrimination. If so, we would be compelled to recognize those seeking open, temporary or polyamorous marriages. It cannot be argued that these folks can be free to enter those relationships but not have legal recognition without acting like hypocrites themselves. If, like most conjugal and revisionist supporters agree, these kinds of unions should not be recognized as marriages, then you have to accept three principles. First, marriage is not totally malleable–it is not “just a contract.” Second, the state is within its rights to recognize only true marriages. Laws that distinguish marriage from other bonds will always leave some arrangements out. Third, there is no general right to marry the person you love, if this means a right to have any kind of relationship recognized as marriage. There is only a general right not to be prevented from forming a true marriage. There is no direct line from the principle of equality to same-sex civil marriage. This series will be concluded in part eight.

                      Part Six                                                                               Part Eight

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What is Marriage? Part Six, Threatening Moral and Religious Freedom

Changes in marriage norms causes harm

Changes in marriage norms causes harm

The harms of redefining civil marriage would extend beyond the couple and their children, to anyone who holds the conjugal view. Americans are not particularly patient with those we think are enemies of equality. People who have attitudes that remind us of Jim Crow, Chinese exclusion laws, Japanese internment camps, or forbidding women the vote are today’s exiles, barred from the public square and even respectable jobs. The revisionist view depends on the idea that there are no important differences between same- and opposite-sex relationships. By endorsing it, the state would imply that the conjugal view makes arbitrary distinctions, and conjugal marriage supporters would become champions of discrimination.

Photographers, caterers, innkeepers, adoption agency officials, parochial school administrators, counselors, foster-care and adoption providers, and others will be forced to comply with the revisionist view or lose their jobs. This is not fear-mongering, this is taking revisionists at their word. If support for conjugal marriage really is like racism, we need only ask how civil society treats racists. In Canada a prominent sportscaster was fired from his job for expression on Twitter of his support for conjugal marriage; a Georgia counselor contracted by the CDC was fired after an investigation into her religiously motivated decision to refer someone in a same-sex relationship to another counselor (that one in particular burns me up, as I am a counselor); a ministry in New Jersey lost its tax-exempt status for denying a lesbian couple use of its facility for a same-sex wedding; and a photographer was prosecuted by the New Mexico Human Rights Commission or declining to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony.

Conflicts with religious liberty are inevitable when marriage is extended to same-sex couples. In Massachusetts, Catholic Charities was forced to give up its adoption services rather than violate its principles by placing children with same-sex cohabitants. When public school began teaching students about same-sex marriages because it was now law, the court found that parents did not have the right to exempt their students. In fact the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty reports that “over 350 separate state anti-discrimination provisions would likely be triggered by recognition of same-sex marriage.” Because of the mutual influence of law and culture, emerging legal trends are mirrored by social ones. A Washington Post story drew cries of journalistic bias for implying that one conjugal view advocate was “sane and thoughtful,” and in fact compared the profile to a piece about a KKK member! A New York Times columnist has called conjugal marriage proponents bigots. Now organizations pushing the legal redefinition of marriage label themselves as “champions of human rights” and opponents of “hate.” And all this has occurred before any nation-wide or state majority legalization for same-sex marriage!

How about undermining friendship? The social prevalence of the revisionist view would make things harder on single people:  as marriage is defined simply as the most valuable or only kind of deep communion, it becomes harder to find emotional and spiritual intimacy in nonmarital friendships. Revisionists cannot define marriage in terms of real bodily union or family life, so they tend to define it instead by its degree or intensity. Marriage is simply your closest relationship, offering the most of the one basic currency of intimacy:  shared emotion and experience. The more we absorb this assumption, the less we value deep friendship in its own right. Self-disclosure, unembarrassed reliance, self-forgetfulness, extravagant expressions of affection and other features of companionship come to seem like unwelcome impositions outside romance and marriage. Here is an article explaining it more fully, it is a deeply thought-out treatise.

It’s been made clear that redefining civil marriage would affect how we conduct our sexual relationships, how we parent, how we treat conscientious dissent, and how we deal with friends. However there is a common “conservative” objection to part of this. Some say that adopting the revisionist view would actually strengthen it, by imposing traditional marital norms–conservative values–on more relationships. Note that it doesn’t show the revisionist view of marriage to be true or the conjugal view false. Untouched are our claims that fathers matter as well as mothers. Nor does it dispel concerns about moral and religious freedom, or the diminution of friendship. If marriage is understood as an essentially emotional union then marital norms, especially permanence and exclusivity, will make less sense. Rather than imposing traditional norms on same-sex relationships, abolishing the conjugal view would tend to erode the basis for those norms in any relationship.

Examples are easy to find. In their statement “Beyond Same-Sex Marriage,” more than 300 scholars and advocates call for legally recognize sexual relationship involving more than two partners. A University of Calgary professor thinks justice requires us to use legal recognition to “denormalize heterosexual monogamy as a way of life.” What about the connection to family life? Andrew Sullivan, who is a conservative proponent of same-sex marriage says that marriage has become “primarily a way in which two adults affirm their emotional commitment to one another.” EJ Graff celebrates that recognizing same-sex unions would change the ‘institution’s message’ so it would “ever after stand for sexual choice, for cutting the link between sex and diapers.”

For those who want more proof, here is a great example: In the 1980’s Professors David McWhirter and Andrew Mattison, themselves in a romantic relationship, set out to disprove popular beliefs about gay partners’ inability to stay monogamous. Of the 156 men they surveyed, whose relationships had lasted from 1 – 37 years, more than 60% had begun the relationship expecting exclusivity, but not one couple stayed sexually exclusive longer than five years. They concluded “the expectation for outside sexual activity was the rule for male couples and the exception for heterosexuals.” Far from disproving popular beliefs, they confirmed them. The NY Times reported on a more recent study that stated, “‘with straight people, it’s called affairs or cheating,’ said Colleen Hoff, the study’s principal investigator, ‘but with gay people it does not have such negative connotations.'” To contrast, 99% of of opposite-sex couples expect sexual exclusivity in their marriage according to a Journal of Sex Research article in 2009, and violations of it are so serious they are “the leading cause of divorce across 160 cultures and are one of the most frequent reasons that couples seek marital therapy.”

It’s important to avoid stereotypes, which exaggerate infidelity unfairly, however I will summarize three studies that address this issue. A 1990’s UK survey of more than 5000 men found that the average numbers of partners over the previous five years for men with exclusively heterosexual inclinations was two, with bisexual inclinations was seven, and with exclusively homosexual inclinations was 10. A US survey found the average number of sexual partners since age 18 for men who identified as homosexual or bisexual was over 2.5 times as many as the average for heterosexual men. Finally, a study of same-sex civil marriages in Norway and Sweden found that “divorce risks are higher in same-sex partnerships than opposite-sex marriage and…unions of lesbians are considerably less stable, or more dynamic, than unions of gay men.”

So this “conservative” objection does not seem to bear out in reality, even in countries where these unions are uniformly legally recognized. There is no reason to believe, and abundant reason to doubt, that redefining civil marriage would make people more likely to abide by its norms. If anything it would undermine people’s grasp of the basis for those norms.

                       Part Five                                                                         Part Seven

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What is Marriage? Part Five, What’s the Harm?

Changes in marriage norms causes harm

Changes in marriage norms causes harm

So, then, what is the harm? To pick up right where we left off, as a revisionist might put it, “how would gay civil marriage affect your lives, liberties, or opportunities, or your own marriages?” Remember that from the beginning I have said that this debate is not about homosexuality, but about marriage. I’ll show later how the conjugal view respects same-sex-attracted people’s equal dignity and basic needs. In this article it will be shown how the revisionist proposal would harm marriage and much else also. Our argument depends on three simple ideas:  law tends to shape beliefs; beliefs shape behavior; beliefs and behavior affect human interests and human well-being. If all can agree on these truths, then, it will be shown that an unsound law of marriage will breed mistaken ideas that will harm not just marriage but parenting, common moral and religious beliefs, and even friendship.

To begin, let’s discuss the harm to marriage and parenting. Remember the law affects our ideas of what is reasonable and appropriate. You might think more of marijuana use if it were allowed, state subsidies of heavy metal music promote a different view of musical merit than chamber music, and a school board curriculum of quack science and chauvinistic history impart a different message about knowledge than one with more rigorous standards. Revisionists are on board with all of these ideas. In fact they find civil unions insufficient even when these offer same-sex unions all the legal benefits of marriage. Redefining marriage though, would change its meaning for everyone. Legally wedded opposite-sex unions would increasingly be defined by what they had in common with same-sex relationships. Marriage, the human good, would be harder to achieve; one can realize marriage only by choosing it, for which you need at least a rough idea of what it really is!

Obscuring the good of marriage to make it harder to live out is the first harm of redefinition:  other harms are the effects of misunderstanding, and failing to live out, true marriage. By warping people’s view of marriage, revisionist policy would make them less able to realize this basic way of thriving–much as a man confused about friendship will have trouble being a friend. As more people absorb the new law’s lesson that marriage is fundamentally about emotions, marriages will increasingly take on emotion’s instability. Since there is no reason that emotional unions should be permanent or limited to two, these norms of marriage would make less sense. It might seem far-fetched to predict that values as cherished as permanence and exclusivity would wane, however even leading revisionists now agree that if sexual complementarity is optional, so are permanence and exclusivity. If marriage is primarily about emotional union, why privilege two-person unions, or permanently committed ones? Also, because children fare best when reared by their wedded biological parents, the same erosion of marital norms would adversely affect children’s health, education and general formation. Additionally the size of the state would balloon, adjudicating breakup and custody issues, meeting the needs of spouses and children affected by divorce, and attempting to contain and feebly correct the challenges these children face. Marriage policy could go bad, and already has in some ways, especially by the introduction of no-fault divorce laws which make marriage contracts easier to break than contracts of any other kind.

Conjugal marriage laws reinforce the idea that the union of husband and wife is the most appropriate environment for rearing children. Recognizing same-sex relationships as marriages would legally abolish that ideal. No civil institution would reinforce the notion that men and women typically have different strengths as parents, or that boys and girls tend to benefit from fathers and mothers in different ways. Revisionist marriage laws would diminish the social pressures and incentives for husbands to remain with their wives and children, or for men and women having children to marry first. Yet the resulting arrangements–parenting by divorced or single parents, or cohabiting couples–are proven to be worse for children, as has been shown in the previous two articles. And mothers and fathers do both bring necessary strengths to the table for children. There is a preponderance of evidence for example, showing that girls are likelier to suffer sexual abuse and to have children as teenagers and out of wedlock if they do not grow up with their father. For their part, boys reared without their father tend to have much higher rates of aggression, delinquency, and incarceration. Rutgers University sociologist David Popenoe states, “we should disavow the notion that mommies can make good daddies, just as we should disavow the popular notion…that daddies can make good mommies… The two sexes are different to the core and each is necessary–culturally and biologically–for the optimal development of a human being.” A University of Virginia sociologist found much the same:  “…the best psychological, sociological and biological research to date now suggests that–on average–men and women bring different gifts to the parenting enterprise, that children benefit from having parents with distinct parenting styles, and that family breakdown poses a serious threat to children and to the societies in which they live.”

There is lots of research out there and not much of it is top-notch. Top-notch research contains large, random and representative samples observed over time (longitudinal). Not one study of same-sex parenting meets this standard of research. By contrast, a 2012 study was completed that was based on a large, random and nationally representative sample regarding outcomes in adulthood of various family structures. Compared to children of parents at least one of whom had had a gay or lesbian relationship, those reared by their married biological parents were found to have fared better on dozens of indicators, and worse on none. Penn State’s professor Paul Amato said the study’s methodological advantages still make it “probably the best that we can hope for, at least in the near future.” Ultimately, we have two reasons to expect that same-sex parenting is generally less effective:  first, every alternative to married biological parenting that has been examined in high-quality studies has consistently been shown less effective, and second, reliable studies suggest that mothers and fathers foster–and their absences impede–child development in different ways. Princeton and Wisconsin sociologists found, based on four longitudinal studies of nationally representative samples including 20,000 subjects, “Children who grow up in a household with only one biological parent are worse off, on average, than children who grow up in a household with both of their biological parents…regardless of whether the resident parent remarries.” This reinforces the idea that the state’s primary interest in upholding marital norms is to keep biological parents together.

In short:  redefining marriage might make it more socially acceptable for fathers to leave their families, for unmarried parents to put off firmer public commitment, or for children to be created for a household without a mother or father. But whatever the cause, there will be a cost to depriving children of the love and knowledge of their married mother and father. Please understand, none of these points implies that men and women in same-sex relationships have weaker devotion, or less capacity for affection. It is no insult to heroic single parents to point to data showing that mother and father together is more effective. What are compared in all cases are the outcomes of various parenting combinations, not individual parents. The next article will cover the consequences to moral and religious beliefs, and friendship.

                      Part Four                                                                       Part Six

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What is Marriage? Part Four, Marriage isn’t Malleable

Marriage's terms are not infinitely negotiable

Marriage’s terms are not infinitely negotiable

This is part four of my series on marriage, summarizing Girgis, Anderson and George’s book and interspersing it with my own comments. This article will focus on the second argument of some who think that marriage is malleable to no end, which is one of the main assumptions by those who want to change marriage laws today. They say “marriage has no distinctive public value, and this being the case the state can remake the definition of marriage to fit whatever our preferences are.” In this case there is no “right answer” for the state’s marriage policy any more than for the national bird, it’s a matter of what folks agree on. There are several problems associated with this view:  first, it’s often motivated by the fallacy that because social practices are partly constructed they must be entirely constructed; I’ll go into what that means shortly. Second, it can make no sense of major philosophical and legal traditions. Third, it contradicts the spirit of most revisionist arguments and would imply that the revisionists’ view is as unjust as they consider the conjugal position to be. Finally, even if this view were true, it would provide no good basis for the revisionist view.

Point one. Marriage is a basic aspect of human well-being, valuable in and of itself, and in a way that other goods cannot substitute for–see Part Two of my series. When I say that permanent commitment is necessary for marriage, I mean there’s a distinctive human good that can only be realized through a vow of permanence–it’s not negotiable. To agree that goods (such as friendship, knowledge, etc) have some objective features one does not need to believe in God, just some constants of human nature. Consider the contrast between marriage and friendship. Marriage and friendship have taken different forms across history, but no one is fooled into thinking that they do not have a basic core quality. True friendship requires mutual good will and cooperation; without this quality, one does not have friendship. A British royal wedding looks very different from a Navajo wedding, for example, but the core qualities remain. Marriage has a core, fixed by our nature as sexually reproductive beings. To deviate from it is to miss a crucial part of this basic human good.

What is considered most basic to marriage–things like bodily union and connection to family life–are nearly universal in marriage practice. So marriage is partly constructed by the culture it is in, but it’s also constructed by our biology and the basic good of family life. This is not the same thing as saying that marriage is *entirely* constructed by society, as if biology and a connection to family could be ignored. In other words, saying that some of the details of marriage can be determined by culture (British royal vs Navajo) is totally different from saying that the basic foundations of marriage is subject to a vote. Marriage is marriage with the accompanying goods if these foundations are present, and is not marriage if they are absent.

Point two. The conjugal view has been developing for as long as there has been sustained reflection on marriage. Important philosophical and legal traditions have long distinguished friendships of all kinds from marriage. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, as well as many others defended this view, even amid highly homoerotic cultures (as the Greeks and Romans were). Plutarch’s definition, for example, of marriage as a special kind of friendship uniquely embodied in sexual intercourse. He also affirms that intercourse with an infertile spouse realizes the good of marriage, something other ancient thinkers took for granted even as they denied that other sexual acts could do the same. To repeat, for hundreds of years, while infertility was no ground for declaring a marriage void, only intercourse between a man and a woman was recognized as consummating (in other words completing) a marriage. No other sexual acts could. If marriage were regarded as simply a legal tool to keep parents together for their children, evidence of infertility (like old age!) would have been grounds for voiding a marriage. If the law were targeting homosexual relationships, it would have counted any sexual act between a man and woman adequate for consummation. There is only one explanation:  the law reflected the rational judgment that unions consummated by sex were valuable in themselves, and uniquely different from other bonds. In short, the conjugal view.

Points three and four. If marriage were a fiction designed to promote a social function, there would be no natural right to marriage that marriage laws might violate by being defective. If this view were true, it would be unjust not to recognize polyamorous unions as marriages. However both of these results are repugnant to most revisionists, and in fact are contradicted by their own arguments. As for the first point, if (as I show in part 5) abolishing the conjugal view of marriage would undermine the stability that makes marriage good for children then traditional marriage law would promise great social usefulness. As to the second point, it’s hard to see how revisionists by their own principles could not recognize polyamorous unions as marriage. The suggestion that those in polyamorous relationships today settle for the freedom to live as they choose but without social approval might seem offensive, but most revisionists support only monogamy as a legal norm. The points here suggest that most people on both sides of our current debate reject this view. They agree that marriage has certain necessary features, they only disagree on whether sexual complementarity is one.

The strong links between stable marriage and children’s welfare, and between children’s welfare and every dimension of the common good give the state strong reasons to recognize marriage. But more liberal critics are also mistaken to think of marriage as merely some tradition of our law and culture. It is a human good with a fixed core that we are equally wise to recognize and unable to reshape. Those that ask “what’s the harm if we did?” is what part five of this series will address.

                   Part Three                                                                      Part Five